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ESSAY
AN OVERVIEW OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976 ;
ROBERT A. GORMAN t
It is through the federal law of copyright that Congress pursues
the constitutional mandate "to promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts." The first copyright act-passed in 1790 and covering
books, maps and charts-announced certain principles that have
shaped our federal law through the bicentennial year, including
a rather short term of protection, a renewal copyright, and a pre-
occupation with "published" works, with the regulation of unpub-
lished works being largely relegated to state law. The better part
of this century has been dominated by a copyright statute enacted
in 1909, before the discovery or full commercial development of
radio, television, the phonograph, the photograph, the motion pic-
ture, the computer, the photocopy machine. The growth of these
media for the creation and dissemination of creative works, the re-
sulting growth in the number of persons whose livelihood depends
on these media, and the expansion of our leisure time have all com-
bined to focus attention upon the obsolescence of the 1909 Act.
After a painstaking reform effort over a period of twenty years,
Congress in 1976 approved a new Copyright Act, most of the pro-
visions of which became effective on January 1, 1978. The purpose
of this Essay is to discuss the principal features of the new law.
All lawyers should have some familiarity with the basic contours
of our copyright law. It no longer touches the lives of a minuscule
segment of our society, witness the number of times we or our family
or friends have written a research piece for school (which we want
to protect against the poaching of our academic supervisor), or have
written a poem or song, or have formed a rock group or even cut a
phonograph record or tape, or have gotten an idea for a new board
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game, or have written a letter to the editor, or have photocopied a
newspaper article, a drawing or a photograph, or have taped recorded
music or a television program off the air. It is not possible to dis-
cuss-or even to set forth-all of the provisions of the new law in the
compass of a short Essay. The Act covers more than sixty pages in
the statute books (almost fifteen percent of which is devoted to the
elaborate provisions dealing with cable television). For details, the
full text of the Act must be consulted. Only the basic contours can
be explored here.
To understand the 1976 Copyright Act, it is helpful to explore
the 1909 Act, if only because so much of the new law is designed to
remedy the omissions and the weaknesses of the old. Both the 1909
and the 1976 Acts will be considered with five principal issues in
mind: (1) the relationship of federal and state law; (2) the concept
of "publication"; (3) copyright formalities; (4) ownership and dura-
tion of copyright; and (5) allowable uses of copyrighted material.
THE COPYRIMGHT AcT OF 1909
The Dual System of Protection. The Constitution empowers
Congress, in order to promote authorship, to grant by legislation an
exclusive right to exploit one's writings. This federal right is to
last only for a limited time. Since the first Copyright Act, however,
Congress chose to leave undisturbed the power of the individual
states to make their own laws (generally by judicial decision rather
than by statute) regulating the exploitation of "unpublished" works.
It was through state law that the author of a manuscript kept in his
desk drawer, or of a letter sent to an acquaintance, was to vindicate
his right to publish those writings first and to prevent others from
doing so. This "right of first publication" was known as common
law copyright. It was unlimited in duration.
Congress did choose to accord to authors of most classes of un-
published works the right-by registering the work and depositing
copies-to secure protection under the Federal Act, with federal sub-
stantive rules and remedies to be enforced exclusively in the federal
courts.' But this was an option to be exercised at the will of the
author, who could still choose to keep the work "private" and
governed by state law. Moreover, federal protection for unpublished
works was available only for works that were commonly exploited
through modes other than the distribution of hard copies, such as
musical compositions, dramatic works and works of art. Federal
1 Copyright Act of 1909, cli. 320, § 11, 35 Stat. 1078 (1909), codified at
17 U.S.C. § 12 (1970) (superseded by Copyright Act of 1976).
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copyright for unpublished literary works (that manuscript and letter)
was not available, and the author was necessarily remitted to state
law.
It was not until a work was "published" that state common law
copyright protection was ousted. Once the book, the play, or the
painting was reproduced in hard copies and distributed generally,
with the consent of the author, the "right of first publication" was
exercised, the author began to derive commercial benefit while
relinquishing physical control over his tangible work product,
and state copyright was "divested." This rule found its source in
both state doctrines of common law copyright and federal doctrines
derived from (although not entirely explicit in) the Copyright Act.
If the author of such a published work took no action to comply
with the Federal Act, then there would be neither state protection
nor federal protection and the work was said to "fall into the public
domain," free for others to copy, to perform or otherwise to exploit
commercially. If, however, the first publication was accompanied
by steps to bring the work within the shelter of the Federal Copy-
right Act, then although state protection was lost, federal protection
was substituted.
Some of the implications of this dual scheme of copyright pro-
tection-such as the significance of "publication" and of federal
copyright formalities-are discussed below. Another significant im-
plication is that the publication of a work preempted state law only
to the extent that state law purported to generate rights akin to
those afforded under the Federal Act, that is, rights "in the nature of
copyright." At base, copyright represents the forms of commercial
exploitation that the law gives exclusively to the copyright owner,
after weighing the interest in remuneration as an incentive for the
author against the interest in inexpensive dissemination to the
public. When the state law that would limit the dissemination of
published works is rooted in some other individual or social interest
-for example, preserving a relationship of trust or contract between
the author and the user, or protecting the public against misleading
assertions of authorship-that state law can to a large degree con-
tinue to flourish alongside the copyright protection afforded by
Congress.
The Importance of "Publication." Since the line dividing state
common law copyright from federal copyright, or alternatively from
irretrievable dedication to the public domain, was that of "publica-
tion," that concept dominated our law of copyright for almost two
centuries. Around this concept swirled a host of abstract and arti-
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ficial guidelines. There developed, for example, the distinction be-
tween "limited" publication and "general" publication, with only
the latter divesting common law copyright.2 The distribution of
copies of a work to a limited number of persons for a limited pur-
pose was a non-divesting limited publication. Classic examples are
the submission of copies of an unpublished poem to a handful of
literary magazines, or the dissemination of a scholarly manuscript to
several experts in the field for perusal and criticism. Once the poem
or manuscript, however, is copied in substantial numbers by the
author and distributed (even without charge) to all comers without
restriction on their use of it, we no longer have a limited distribu-
tion, and-failing compliance with the notice requirements of the
Federal Act-copyright is forever lost. Where to draw the line be-
tween limited and general publication in particular cases was any-
body's guess (with the guess of the court of last resort being con-
trolling).
More abstract and artificial yet was the application of the con-
cept of "publication" to works that were profitably exploited
through means other than the distribution of hard copies. The
performance of a play or a musical composition, or the delivery of
a lecture or speech, to hundreds or thousands of persons (or, through
the magic of motion pictures, radio or television, to millions of
persons), surely forfeited any valid concern of the author for his
privacy and often generated compensation far in excess of the
prototypical sale of hard copies of literary works. Yet the prevailing
view under our law, before and throughout the life of the 1909
Copyright Act, was that "performance does not divest" common law
copyright, which could flourish in perpetuity.3 Only the dissemina-
tion of hard copies in eye-readable form was regarded by the
courts as a "publication" that could entail loss of state copyright
protection.4
Strict Federal Copyright Formalities. Under the 1909 Act, the
"publication" of a work resulted in forfeiture of copyright absent
2 E.g., White v. Kimmell, 193 F.2d 744 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 957
(1952).
3 Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424 (1912).
4 The seminal White-Smith Music Publ. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908),
decided even before the advent of the 1909 Act that recordings of copyrighted songs
for playback on player pianos (and thus, by extension, phonograph recording) did
not infringe the copyright in the musical compositions as such "copies" were not
in eye-readable form. Courts have continued to puzzle whether that case requires
the conclusion that a phonograph recording is not a divestive publication of the
underlying music. Compare Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., Inc. v. Miracle Record Co.,
Inc., 91 F. Supp. 473 (N.D. Ill. 1950), with Yacoubian v. Carroll, 74 U.S.P.Q. 257
(S.D. Cal. 1947).
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compliance with federal copyright formalities. Those formalities
were (and remain today) rather simple, but greatly misunderstood.
The copyright proprietor must place a notice of copyright on each
distributed copy; nothing more. With some exceptions, the notice
required by the 1909 Act contained three elements: the word "Copy-
right" (or a designated abbreviation or symbol), the name of the
copyright proprietor, and the date of publication. The notice was
to be placed on the work at a location expressly stipulated in the Act.
Failure to affix a correct notice at the correct location on any
number of copies thrust the work into the public domain.5
Such grave consequences did not, however, attach to a failure
to register the copyright or to deposit copies of the work with the
Copyright Office. Registration and deposit were held not to be
prerequisites for securing or maintaining a valid copyright. They
were prerequisites to a suit for copyright infringement. The Su-
preme Court held that even if registration and deposit were delayed
for many months after publication of a work, they could be validly
effected by the copyright proprietor immediately prior to commenc-
ing an action, and damages could be secured even for infringements
which took place prior to registration and. deposit.6
Indivisible Ownership and the Duration and Renewal of Copy-
right. In many important respects, ownership of copyright in a
work of literature, music or art is like ownership of a cow. It gives
exclusive rights to the use of a "thing," which rights can be con-
veyed to others inter vivos or by will or intestate succession. Copy-
right ownership, too, since the beginnings of American law has
been traceable to a particular person or persons who have "title" to
the thing. The 1909 Copyright Act generally referred to that per-
son or persons as the "proprietor" of copyright. It was that person
in whose name the copyright was registered, whose name was en-
tered in the copyright notice, and who was the proper and necessary
party plaintiff in actions for infringement of copyright. That
person could permit others, by a "license," to serialize his novel or
read his poem on commercial television or sing his song in the
concert hall, just as the owner of the cow could permit others to
ride on her, milk her or use her for mating. But such licenses or
permissions did not fragment the ownership; it was said to be "in-
divisible." Because of the doctrine of indivisibility of copyright
ownership-and the attendant implications for registration, notice
5 See, e.g., National Comics Pubi., Inc. v. Fawcett Publ., Inc., 191 F.2d 594
(2d Cir. 1951) (Superman v. Captain Marvel).
6 Washingtonian Pubi, Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30 (1939).
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and suit-our law derived the distinction between the license, which
did not transfer proprietorship of copyright, and the assignment,
which did. Courts were often called upon to count and weigh the
number of straws from the copyright "bundle" conveyed by the
proprietor to the user.
7
Copyright ownership was, however, different from cow owner-
ship in at least two major respects. Commercial exploitation of the
cow generally required control over her physical presence-whether
that was for riding, milking or mating. Not so copyright, which
could be exploited without the original object near at hand, witness
the performance of a play or song or the distribution of copies of
an original work of art. This distinction between copyright and
physical object sometimes led to disputes between the owner of the
physical object and a purported copyright proprietor as to whether
transfer of the object carried with it an assignment of copyright.
Because a number of these disputes centered upon works that were
unpublished at the time of their transfer, they were commonly
resolved in state courts. Although the decisions are few, they tended
to announce a presumption that an unqualified transfer of the
physical object (the manuscript or the painting) carried with it an
assignment of copyright as well." When the work was, at the time
of transfer, already protected under the Federal Copyright Act-
whether as published or unpublished-that Act announced the con-
verse presumption.9
A second principal distinction between ownership of copyright
and ownership of a chattel has been that, once a work is exploited
in published form, the copyright is limited in duration. Congress'
power to grant copyright is subject to the constitutional require-
ment that the right be "for limited Times." (No such limitation as
to common law copyright was thought deducible, as against the
states, from the constitutional provision.) For nearly two hundred
years, Congress provided for copyright protection for a stipulated
number of years, to be followed by a second term of protection at
the option of the author, upon compliance with additional formali-
ties. Under the 1909 Act, the initial term of copyright protection
was twenty-eight years; so too was the renewal term. American law
has been unique among the copyright laws of the world in utilizing
7 See Chief Judge Lumbard's survey of the indivisibility doctrine in Goodis v.
United Artists Television, Inc., 425 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1970).
8 E.g., Pushman v. New York Graphic Soc., Inc., 287 N.Y. 302, 39 N.E.2d 249
(1942).
9 Copyright Act of 1909, cb. 320, § 41, 35 Stat. 1084 (1909) codified at 17
U.S.C. § 27 (1970) (superseded by Copyright Act of 1976).
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such a renewal format. Its purpose was at least twofold. First, it
invited the expiration of copyright (and thus free public utilization)
after a relatively short time, should a renewal copyright not. be
secured; the great preponderance of copyrighted works fell into the
public domain after the first term. Second, it protected the author
against unremunerative transfers of copyright in works whose value
was speculative; courts held that the renewal term of copyright
vested in the author, free and clear of copyright transfers and other
encumbrances suffered during the initial term. (A rather gaping
hole was made in this protective scheme when the Supreme Court
held in 1943 that the author could during the initial term make a
binding transfer of his interest in the renewal term.) 10 If the
author had died when the renewal term was to begin, ownership
of that term could be claimed by the surviving spouse and children;
or, if there were none, then by the author's executor for persons
named in the author's will; or, if there were no spouse, children or
will, then by the author's next of kin. This elaborate protective
arrangement was expressly spelled out in the 1909 Act and applied
to most works copyrighted under the Act (the principal exception
being "works made for hire," the renewal term of which could be
claimed by the "proprietor" or assignee of copyright as distinguished
from the individual author).
The effect of the "limited times" provision of the Constitution,
and the 28-year initial term and 28-year renewal term of the 1909
Act, was that many precocious authors, artists or composers found
their copyrights expiring during their lifetime. Moreover, because
the running of the 28-year or 56-year period commenced with the
date on which federal copyright was secured (generally, the date of
first publication) for any particular work, different works of the
same author, artist or composer would fall into the public domain
at different times.
Permitted Uses of Copyrighted Works. Although the 1909
Copyright Act nowhere defined the term "infringement," it was
obvious that this was the unauthorized exercise of any of the exclu-
sive rights granted to the copyright proprietor in section 1 of the
Act. Certain exclusive rights were granted regardless of the kind of
work copyrighted. Whether the work was a literary work, a musical
composition, a work of art or a motion picture (brought within the
statute in 1912), it was, absent the consent of the copyright owner,
an infringement to print or copy the work, to sell it (if one had not
acquired the original work or copy through a lawful transfer), or to
0 Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643 (1943).
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prepare what became known as a "derivative work," such as a
translation, dramatization, adaptation or other version. Other kinds
of works, which could be exploited through means other than copy-
ing and the preparation of derivative works, were given additional
protection against infringement. The copyright proprietor of a
lecture or sermon or other nondramatic literary work had the exclu-
sive right to render or read it "in public for profit" or to make
(and play) any recording of it. The owner of copyright in a
dramatic work had comparable rights, except that the "performance
right" extended to all public performances, whether or not for
profit. Copyright in a musical composition conferred the exclusive
right to perform it in public for profit, to make an arrangement
of the music for such performance, and to make the first recording
of the composition; after the copyright owner permitted the making
of such first recording, other recording artists could make their own
recordings (with their own musical arrangements) upon filing notice
and paying a royalty normally calculated at two cents per record.
This latter statutory provision, designed to avoid a monopoly over
the manufacturing of record discs and piano rolls in the early years
of this century, became known as the "compulsory license" provi-
sion, because others were permitted to record whether or not the
copyright proprietor gave consent. In 1972, limited protection was
granted to owners of copyright in a "sound recording," the fixed
rendition of sounds on a record or tape as distinguished from the
text or musical composition rendered. No other person may dupli-
cate the same sound recording by capturing the sounds directly from
it (sometimes known as "dubbing" or, by the less charitable, as
record or tape "piracy").
Despite the broad range of exclusive rights given the copy-
right proprietor, many uses of copyrighted works were permitted
under the 1909 Copyright Act. A person rightfully owning a
physical object, such as a manuscript or a painting, could sell it to
any person he wished at any price he wished (indeed, he could
presumably destroy it) without the consent of the copyright pro-
prietor. Dramatic and nondramatic literary works, musical com-
positions, and sound recordings could be rendered to others, if the
performance were not "public" (nowhere defined in the 1909 Act).
Even public performances of nondramatic literary works and musi-
cal compositions were permitted, provided they were not for "profit"
(nowhere defined in the 1909 Act). Such unauthorized private or
non-profit performances were assumed by Congress not to interfere
unduly with the economic recompense, and thus the incentive, of
1978]
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* the author or composer. Even profitable public performances of
musical compositions were privileged if done by means of a phono-
Tecord in a jukebox; the statute expressly provided this so-called
"jukebox exemption" in 1909, thus tolerating the de minimis
incursions of the "penny parlor" or coin-operated player-piano per-
formances at the turn of the century, and what became the not so
,de minimis incursions on public-performance fights during the past
four decades. Nor did the public and for-profit performance of a
"sound recording"-by playing it, for example, over radio or tele-
vision or at a discotheque-result in liability to the copyright owner
of the sound recording (as distinguished from the liability for
royalties to the owner of copyright in any musical composition in-
-scribed thereon).
In addition to these permitted uses of copyrighted works, set
forth with varying degrees of explicitness in the 1909 Act, the courts
have been responsible for creating two rather striking exemptions
from the reach of the copyright monopoly.
The more recent of these two exemptions was that accorded
cable television. It was argued by owners of copyright in television
programs (dramatic, nondramatic or musical) that cable systems that
captured and transmitted television signals so that they could be
seen by viewers to whom they were otherwise inaccessible were
"performing" the work, just as a song is "performed" not only by
the orchestra in the television studio but also by the television
broadcaster itself. (The copyright proprietors also argued that the
performance by the cable system was in public and for profit.) The
Supreme Court rejected this claim in 1968, in Fortnightly Corp. v.
United Artists Television, Inc.,11 and again in 1974, in Tele-
prompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 2 both as
to cable systems serving a "fill in" function in locations where the
broadcast signal would be received were it not for tall buildings or
mountains, and to cable systems transporting television signals for
hundreds of miles, well beyond the market in which the program
was initially broadcast. The Court simply concluded that cable
systems were functionally more akin to viewers of television, who
do not "perform" the copyrighted work, than to broadcasters,
who do.
The judicially developed privilege of more ancient vintage-
known as the "fair use" doctrine-dates back almost a century and a
half. The Supreme Court, and other courts, have frequently held
11382 U.S. 390 (1968).
12415 U.S. 394 (1974).
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that certain uses of copyrighted works that appear to constitute in-
fringements are in fact "fair" and allowable, without the consent
of the copyright proprietor, in view of the public interest in dis-
seminating portions (and on rare occasions all) of a copyrighted
work. The classic examples are the "copies" of short quotations
from literary works for the purpose of serious criticism in books or
periodicals, and the handwritten "copy" of short passages from a
scientific work made by a scholar for his personal research files.
The "fair use" doctrine was not announced in the 1909 Act, and its
shape and limits are all but impossible to articulate in anything
but the most general terms. Somewhat related to the fair use doc-
trine is the doctrine of comparable vintage which permits users
of copyrighted works to borrow, use and exploit the "idea" or
"system" which is described in a copyrighted work, as distinguished
from the sequence of words in which that idea or system is com-
municated.13 Here too, it is believed that to grant the broader
monopoly would disserve the public interest, at least absent com-
pliance with the more rigorous requirements (and shorter protec-
tion) of the patent system.
THE COPYRIGHT AcT OF 1976
Exclusive Federal Protection for Written Works. The single
change in the new Copyright Act that is of perhaps the greatest
jurisprudential moment is that which altogether displaces common
law copyright under state law for works that are embraced by the
Federal Act and that "are fixed in a tangible medium of expres-
sion." 14 From the moment that the author's pen imprints words on
foolscap, or the composer's pen makes musical markings on blank
notation paper, or the artist puts brush and oil to canvas, the work
has become in the constitutional sense a "Writing" and is, pursuant
to the 1976 Act, covered by federal copyright-with federal court
jurisdiction, federal substantive rules and federal remedies-and
state law equivalent to copyright is completely ousted from opera-
tion. This federal preemption of the field applies not only to works
created after January 1, 1978, but also to works already created at
that date, whether those works are published or unpublished. The
so-called "right of first publication" of written or "fixed" works is
now protected exclusively by federal law, and not at all by state
law. No longer will unpublished fixed works be subject to per-
'3 Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880).
14 17 U.S.C.A. § 301(a) (Supp. 1977).
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petual protection in the nature of copyright. No longer will the
line of "publication"-and within that narrow line, the distinction
between limited and general publication-demark the departure
from state law and the entry into the domain of federal law.
Since most works presently known or contemplated by the mind
of man fall within the list of works to which federal copyright ex-
tends under the new Act (even a computer program is to be deemed
a "literary work" 15), the principal exclusion from the statute's pre-
emptive reach will be works that are not "fixed in a tangible
medium of expression." (Such "fixation" need not be eye-readable,
for the new Act requires simply that the work have sufficient per-
manence so that it may be perceived, reproduced or otherwise com-
municated "either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device." 16) Examples of such unfixed works are extemporized-or
even rehearsed, provided there is nothing comparable to a written
script-dances, comedic routines or musical performances. Any
such unfixed work is thus subject to regulation by the states which
may bar others from making readable copies of the work, or filming
or taping it, or even performing it. If, however, the copyright
owner permits such a work to be "fixed" simultaneously with the
extemporaneous performance, for example by a recording or a
motion picture, the work falls within the preemptive reach of the
new Federal Act.
A potentially far more important exception from the preemp-
tive reach of the Federal Act-even with regard to "fixed" works
within the coverage of the Act-gives to the states, under their
common law or statutes, the power to accord "rights that are not
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope"
of those accorded by the 1976 statute.17 Although the penultimate
version of section 301(b)(3) of the new Act had contained an item-
ization of those kinds of rights not equivalent to copyright, that
list was stricken after a most cryptic colloquy on the floor of the
House of Representatives. The House Committee Report that
accompanied the bill to the floor nonetheless probably still states
what will be regarded as the state causes of action with respect to
copyrighted works that survive the new Federal Act: "The evolving
common law rights of 'privacy,' 'publicity,' and trade secrets, and
the general laws of defamation and fraud, would remain unaffected
as long as the causes of action contain elements, such as an invasion
it Id. § 101.
16 Id. The distinction under the 1909 Act is discussed at note 4 supra.
'7 17 U.S.C.A. § 301(b)(3) (Supp. 1977).
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of personal rights or a breach of trust or confidentiality, that are
different in kind from copyright infringement." 's (The Report
also adverted to the continuing vitality of actions for breach of
contract under state law.) For example, a person may lawfully
secure both physical possession of, and copyright ownership in,
certain handwritten letters, such that his reproduction of those
letters will not infringe any federal copyright interest of the author;
but the reproduction of those letters might in appropriate circum-
stances lay open that person to a valid claim that there has been a
violation of the author's "privacy" interest under state law. So, too,
that state cause of action theoretically might still be available to the
heirs of the author long after the author has died and the federal
copyright has expired.
A particularly vexing issue-both under the 1909 Act and the
1976 Act-is the extent to which the state may continue to grant a
cause of action against "unfair competition" in the use of copy-
righted works. That branch of state unfair competition law com-
monly known as "passing off" is in substance a tort that is the con-
verse of copyright infringement; the defendant does not plagiarize
the work or the product created by a plaintiff-author, but rather
disseminates his own work or product and creates the misleading
impression by labeling or advertising that the plaintiff, generally
better known and more highly regarded than he, is the author. It
is rather clear that the state tort of passing off, a branch of the law
barring deception and fraud, may still flourish after the 1976 Act;
the plaintiff complains not that his work has been copied, but that
the defendant's work is indeed terribly different from his. That
branch of state unfair competition law commonly known as "mis-
appropriation" is, however, more reminiscent of copyright. The
defendant is taking the intellectual (or industrial) product of the
plaintiff author, and disseminating it to the public while creating
the impression that he, the defendant-user, is the author. In sub-
stance, the defendant is deriving commercial benefit from the ex-
ploitation of a work or product "not his own" (even apart from
any misleading impression on the part of the public about who the
creator really is); in a word, he is "copying" or "performing" an-
other's work. This is misappropriation. But it is also copyright
infringement.
Is H.R. RBP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 132 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as "REPORT"]. For a recent decision upholding an action premised on a state-
created "right of publicity" against "appropriation" (by means of a television news
camera) of a performer's act, see Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 97
S. Ct. 2849 (1977) ("the human cannonball").
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One would think that state outlawry of copying or performing,
under the rubric of "misappropriation," would be preempted by the
1976 Federal Act for works listed in the Act and fixed in tangible
form. 9 While that presumably will be true in most instances, one
must reckon with the apparently lively ghost of the Supreme Court
decision in International News Service v. Associated Press20 in
which the Supreme Court held that the common law could outlaw
the competitive dissemination by one news service of uncopyrighted
(and perhaps uncopyrightable, as lacking in authorship) news stories
and news content unearthed and written by a rival news service.
The gist of the common law claim was plagiarism, which was argu-
ably congruent with and preempted by federal statutory claims, but
the Court found that this damaging competitive use generated "uI-
just enrichment" and "reaping where one had not sown" and held
it tortious and enjoinable. The Report of the House Committee
accompanying the bill that was to become the 1976 Act states that
the principle of the INS case, and some vestige of state misappro-
priation law, will survive the Act, particularly with regard to the
unauthorized tapping of computer data banks (normally uncopy-
rightable in their substance as opposed to their configuration) for
competitive commercial purposes. 2 1 Whether that suggestion will
be endorsed by the courts, and whether it will be expanded, is a
major issue awaiting resolution.
The Vanishing Significance of "Publication." As has been
noted above, federal copyright attaches the moment a work is fixed
in tangible form, and state protection in the nature of copyright is
ousted. "Fixation" is the magic moment for this loss of state pro-
tection, and not any longer "publication." No longer is there any
concern whether an instantaneous loss of all copyright protection
has followed from a distribution, more general than limited, of hard
copies, or from a performance. We are not altogether rid of the
"publication" beast, however, because the 1976 Act provides that its
protection will not be available to works created prior to January 1,
1978 if "theretofore in the public domain." 22
"Publication" is in fact, and at last, defined in the new Act, and
the definition is similar to that obtaining under the 1909 Act.
Publication is "the distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work
to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental,
19 See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco
Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
20248 U.S. 215 (1918).
21 PEPowr, supra note 18, at 132.
22 17 U.S.C.A. § 303 (Supp. 1977).
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lease, or lending.. . . A public performance or display of a work
does not of itself constitute publication." 23 The date of "publica-
tion" is important for two purposes under the 1976 Act. The period
of copyright protection for works whose author is not identified
(anonymous or pseudonymous works) expires 75 years from publica-
tion or 100 years from creation (or fixation), whichever is sooner.
2'
Copyright notice for most works must bear the year date of publica-
tion, and must-as will be explained immediately below-normally
be affixed to the work within five years of publication.
More Lenient Statutory Formalities. While the United States
remains unusual in its emphasis on such formalities as notice, regis-
tration and deposit, those formalities do not have quite the grave
implications they did under the 1909 Act where, for example, pub-
lication without notice immediately thrust the work into the public
domain. The new Act still states that a notice "shall" be placed on
all copies of a work, and on all phonorecords embodying a sound
recording, when these have been "published" (that is, distributed in
hard form) with the authority of the copyright owner.25 The form
of notice is substantially what it has been under the 1909 Act (in-
cluding P-in-a-circle to protect sound recordings against dubbing),
although the statutory rules regarding the placement of the notice
are not quite as particularized as in the 1909 Act. The notice shall
be placed "in such manner and location as to give reasonable notice
of the claim of copyright," and the Register of Copyrights is directed
to prescribe illustrative methods and positions of affixation.26
Omissions of and errors in the copyright notice, formerly fatal,
are no longer so. Federal copyright protection will not be divested
if notice is omitted altogether from only a "relatively small number"
of copies or phonorecords distributed to the public.27 More impor-
tant, even if the notice is omitted from all distributed copies or
phonorecords, the copyright is not invalidated if the work is regis-
tered with the Copyright Office within five years of publication
without notice and if a "reasonable effort" is made to add notice to
all copies or phonorecords distributed to the public after the omis-
sion has been discovered.
2s
A person who innocently "infringes" a copyright that is saved
by registration within the five-year grace period, and who relied on
23 Id. § 101.
241d. § 302(c).
251d. §§ 401(a), 402(a).
26 Id. § 401(c).
27 Id. § 405(a)(1).
28Id. §405(a) (2).
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the absence of notice, is not in an altogether happy position; no
damages may be assessed for infringements committed prior to being
notified of the copyright owner's registration (although the statute
appears not to shelter him similarly for his "works in process" at
that time), and the court has the discretion to direct the innocent
infringer to disgorge profits made by him even during the period of
"innocence" and the discretion as well to enjoin future infringe-
ments. 29 The effect of this provision of the 1976 Act is to require
all persons making copies of (or performing or recording or dub-
bing) a work that lacks any copyright notice to consult the registra-
tion files of the Copyright Office, lest he become committed to a
commercial venture which may be aborted should the copyright
proprietor, having registered the work in the meantime, give notice
of such registration to the prospective user of the work.
This emphasis on "title searching" in the Copyright Office is
highlighted further by a new statutory provision dealing with error
in the name incorporated in the copyright notice. Under the 1909
Act, the insertion of the name of a person other than the "pro-
prietor" would in almost all cases forfeit the copyright. 30  Under
the 1976 Act, however, such an error is not fatal, but merely pro-
vides a defense to a user of the work who, relying on the erroneous
name in the notice, "began the undertaking in good faith under a
purported transfer or license from the person named therein." 31
And even this defense is lost if, before the undertaking was begun,
the work was registered in the name of the true copyright owner.
Nor are errors in the year date fatal any longer, as they were under
the 1909 Act if the error, by noting a year date which is later than
the actual date of publication, purports to extend the duration of
copyright. Under the 1976 Act, if the year date is more than one
year later than the year of first publication, the case is treated as
though the notice was altogether omitted, so that the five-year grace
period for registration will obtain.
32
As was true under the 1909 Act, registration and deposit under
the new Act are not conditions to preserving the copyright, but they
are conditions upon initiating an action for infringement and upon
29 Id. § 405(b).
30 This pitfall is typified by Group Publs. v. WinchelU, 86 F. Supp. 573, 576
(S.D.N.Y. 1952) ("[T]he substitution of the name of an assignee in a notice of
copyright prior to the recordation of assignment, results in an abandonment of the
copyright and a dedication of the work to the public.").
3117 U.S.C.A. § 406(a) (Supp. 1977).
32 Id. § 406(b).
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the award of certain desirable remedies for pre-registration infringe-
ments. 33
Single, Extended Term of Protection. While it is the federal-
preemption feature of the new law that may most attract the interest
of the cognoscenti, the feature that will have perhaps the greatest
impact upon the use of copyrighted material is the elimination of
the fifty-sLx year limit on copyright protection and the elimination
of the renewal format for newly created works. All works "created"
on or after January 1, 1978 will be protected by federal copyright
for a single term, until fifty years after the death of the author. If
the work has been jointly authored, the fifty-year period begins to
run from the death of the last surviving author. 34 The basic effect
of this change is to extend the period of copyright protection for
most works, although it will of course shorten the period of per-
petual protection formerly available under state law for unpublished
works. It has been estimated that the "life plus fifty" format will
extend copyright in most works to an average of roughly seventy-five
years. When initially proposed, this substantial extension beyond
the former 28-year or 56-year period upset certain user groups,
particularly in the scholarly community, but their opposition was
dissipated fairly early in the battle for copyright revision. The
arguments for extension-particularly the increase in life expectancy
since 1909, the ever-developing media for the exploitation of creative
works, and the significant endorsement of the "life plus fifty" format
among foreign nations-carried the day.
Because the date of "publication" will no longer constitute the
measuring point for the protection of most works, copyright pro-
tection for all of the works created by an author-regardless of date
of creation or publication and regardless of genre-will terminate at
the same time. While this will simplify copyright accounting in the
case of authors whose date of death is known, it will in other cases
make life rather more difficult for the user since it will no longer
suffice (for a work bearing a copyright date of 1978 or later) to add
twenty-eight or fifty-six years to the year date in the copyright notice
to determine whether the copyright is still valid. The user will
instead have to determine the year date of the author's death, which
will be accessible through records of the Copyright Office and per-
haps through library card catalogues.
The "life plus fifty" format is declared by the 1976 Act to be
applicable not only to works created after January 1, 1978, but also
33 Id. § 411.
34 Id. §302.
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to earlier created works that on that date remain unpublished and
covered by state common law copyright (that is, to works that have
not yet fallen into the public domain). Those works-for example,
letters written by important historical figures-will thus be thrust
into the public domain fifty years after the death of the author. In
fairness to works that would already have passed this point as of
January 1, 1978, the statute provides that no such work will fall into
the public domain prior to December 31, 2002; if the work is first
published before that date, the period of protection will be extended
to the year 2027 (a statutory inducement to bring the work into the
open through publication). 5
By according federal copyright protection for "life plus fifty" to
works created after January 1, 1978, Congress has eliminated the
"renewal" feature that has characterized our federal law since 1790.
Because of its complexities and its intimate relationship for so long
with that hoary concept "publication," the renewal feature was an
early, and unlamented, target in the movement for copyright reform.
But Congress did feel a need to emulate the renewal format in one
of its objectives: the protection of authors against unremunerative
transfers of copyright that would otherwise disadvantage those
authors for the life of the copyright. No longer (for works created
after January 1, 1978) can the copyright "spring back" to the author
automatically after twenty-eight years, to be renewed free and clear
of earlier conveyances during the initial term. Instead, the new law
empowers the author, or a surviving spouse and children, to termi-
nate any transfer of an interest in the copyright, thirty-five years
after the date of that transfer, when the initial transfer was made by
the author inter vivos.86 The termination after thirty-five years is
not automatic, but must be precipitated by timely notice given by
the author or, if the author is dead at that time, by persons who
under the statute are entitled to exercise more than one-half of the
author's interest. The statute protects the persons who are em-
powered to terminate an earlier transfer by providing that they may
not divest themselves of this power in advance by any agreement.
These "termination of transfer" provisions are extraordinarily elabo-
rate, making the 1909 renewal provisions read like light prose; they
must be consulted for an appreciation of the details.37
In spite of the perceived virtues of the "life plus fifty" format
for newly created works-an extension of copyright and a scrapping
5 Id. §303.
36Id. 203.
87 See Nimmer, Termination of Transfers Under the Copyright Act of 1976,
125 U. PA. L. REv. 947 (1977).
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of the renewal format-it was thought too disruptive of expectations
and business arrangements to substitute that format for works al-
ready copyrighted under the Federal Act at the time the 1976 Act
went into effect. Congress did, however, conclude that it was ap-
propriate to extend the duration of copyright protection for such
works while preserving the renewal format of the 1909 Act. Thus,
works in their renewal term on January 1, 1978 will have that term
automatically extended from tventy-eight years to forty-seven years;
the original term of twenty-eight years along with the extended
forty-seven-year renewal term will give the author a total of seventy-
five years of copyright protection. 8 The same benefit is given to
owners of copyrights that are in their first twenty-eight-year term on
January 1, 1978.89 If copyright in those works is timely renewed
(pursuant to the elaborate provisions carried forward from the 1909
Act for different classes of statutory successors, if the author is not
alive), the renewal term will run for forty-seven years. But if copy-
right is not timely renewed in the twenty-eighth year of the initial
term, copyright will lapse. Thus, the obligation to renew will be
with us for tventy-eight more years, for all works in their first copy-
right term at the end of 1977, and this fact ought not be ignored in
our exuberance for the "life plus fifty" format.
In tidying up the provisions governing the transition to the
new law, Congress considered the case of the author (or family) who,
prior to January 1, 1978, had transferred an interest in the renewal
copyright, of course not appreciating that under the new Act the
renewal term would be extended from twenty-eight to forty-seven
years. Congress wanted to give the benefit of the additional years
in the renewal term to the author or his family rather than to any
person to whom the renewal term might have been effectively trans-
ferred prior to January 1, 1978. Accordingly, the transfer of the
renewal interest in such cases may be terminated (by the author, or
by stipulated survivors in stipulated proportions) at the end of fifty-
six years from the date copyright was originally secured. 40 Like
transfers made in 1978 and thereafter, terminations of these "re-
newal term" transfers are not automatic, and if the persons with the
power to terminate fail to do so in a timely manner, the transfer will
continue in effect.
The new Act makes two other important declarations with re-
gard to copyright ownership, one of which confirms an earlier rule
38 17 U.S.C.A. § 304(b) (Supp. 1977).
S9 Id. § 304(a).
40 Id. § 304(c).
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and one of which reverses an earlier rule. Under the new Act, as
under the 1909 Act, an unqualified transfer of title to the physical
object embodying a work of literature, art or music will not, of
itself, convey the copyright.41 A distinct intention to transfer the
copyright must thus be clearly manifested. In any event, the copy-
right transfer in order to be valid must be manifested in a writing
(either the conveyance itself or a memorandum thereof) that is
signed by the transferor or his agent. What was the prevailing
principle of "indivisibility" of copyright ownership has been changed
by the 1976 Act, which contemplates the "ownership" of any ex-
clusive right comprised in a copyright, and the assertion by such an
owner of many of the rights which under the 1909 Act would have
been held exclusively by the "proprietor" or "assignee," such as the
right to include one's name in the copyright notice and the right to
sue.4 2 Thus, the exclusive right to dramatize a novel, or the exclu-
sive right to perform a play in public, can be owned separately and
enforced independently.
The Expanded Definition of Infringement. The 1976 Copy-
right Act gives to the copyright owner a significantly expanded set
of exclusive rights beyond those given in the 1909 Act.43 Phrased
another way, many formerly permitted uses will now be infringe-
ments. The one significant respect in which it might be said that
the copyright interests of the author have been curtailed is the ex-
tension of the "compulsory license" concept beyond the field of
musical recordings. As will be seen below, the right given by the
new law to jukebox operators, cable television operators and non-
commercial broadcasters to make certain uses of copyrighted works
without the consent of the copyright owner (upon the payment of
certain stipulated royalties) does to some extent deprive those owners
of the "exclusive Right to their respective Writings." As a practical
matter, however, since the law under the 1909 Act gave the copy-
right owner no recourse whatever against the kinds of uses now
subject to the compulsory license, the 1976 Act can be read as rather
consistently expandng the exclusive rights of the copyright owner,
even if not necessarily to their constitutional limits.
Most of the copyright owner's exclusive rights under the 1976
Act represent merely a new collation and streamlining of the rights
under the earlier law: to reproduce (rather than "to print, reprint,
publish', copy"), to prepare derivative works (rather than to trans-
41 Id. § 202.
42 id. § 201(d)(2).
43 See id. §§ 106-18.
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late, to make versions, to dramatize, to convert into a novel, to
arrange, to adapt, to complete, execute and finish), to distribute
copies by sale or other transfer, and to display publicly. The latter
exclusive right-defined by the new statute as the public showing of
a copy of a work either directly or by means of a film, slide, tele-
vision image or any other device-is one that some courts were
hesitant to find in the 1909 Act, but that could at least in the case
of a slide or television projection, rather comfortably fall within
the term "copy" in that legislation. The public exhibition, for
direct viewing, of a work of art by its rightful owner is not an
infringement of copyright, even if the consent of the copyright
owner has not been secured; this is an explicit exception to the
exclusive right of public display. The new law also puts an end
to the confusion generated under the 1909 Act by the limitation
under the old law of the term "copy" to works readable by the eye.
It will henceforth be an infringement to reproduce a work in other
than eye-readable form; it is now unlawful, without the consent of
the copyright owner, to "fix" the copyrighted work in any manner
through which it can be "perceived, reproduced, or otherwise com-
municated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device."
Copyright can thus be infringed when a work is, without authoriza-
tion, inscribed upon a computer punchcard, a magnetic tape or a
wax phonorecord.44
The most broad-ranging changes in the 1976 Act on the issue
of infringement relate to the performance right. Certain perform-
ances of copyrighted works that were allowable under the 1909 Act
are now infringements. Other formerly allowable performances are
now subject to compulsory license, with the user obligated to pay
a royalty specified in the statute.
Under the 1909 Act, one could freely sing or play music, read
a poem or deliver a sermon or lecture in public, provided the per-
formance was not "for profit." Under the 1976 Act, a public
performance of a musical composition, nondramatic literary work,
dramatic or choreographic work, or a motion picture will infringe,
even if not "for profit." The new Act goes on, however, specifically
to exempt-in the fairly elaborate provisions of section 110-a num-
ber of public performances from the reach of the copyright monop-
oly, and thus renders the new law in most respects congruent with
the old. To the extent there are differences, the copyright owner
is generally favored.
44 See id. § 101 (defining "copies").
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Thus, the performance of a dramatic work by students and
teacher in a classroom would not infringe, either under the 1909
Act (because not a "public" performance) or the 1976 Act (because
of a specific exemption in section 110(1)). However, if the class-
room actors are professionals, or the student performance is ren-
dered in the school auditorium, the performance will not clearly
fall within the 1976 exemption and will infringe. It is doubtful
that these performances would have been infringements before,
since they probably would have been held not to be "public" per-
formances under the 1909 Act, which left that term undefined. The
1976 Act defines that term, rather broadly, to embrace "any place
where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle
of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered." 45
Public performances of songs or nondramatic literary works at
school, religious or charitable functions were also broadly exempted
under the 1909 Act, if-in spite of the fact that they were public-
they were "not for profit," a phrase also left undefined by the Act.
Now, such public performances are prima facie infringements, and
a number of formerly allowable performances are no longer spe-
cifically exempted. Even if school or church performers render a
song or poem without payment for their services, if there is an
admission charge to the event-even though the proceeds are exclu-
sively devoted to educational, religious or charitable purposes-the
copyright owner may object to the performance by giving timely
notice.46 Thus, performances of music by school bands or church
choirs, at money-raising events for their institutions, can be infringe-
ments under the new law. It remains to be seen, of course, how
many copyright owners will learn of these events in advance and file
timely notices of objection. There will be no infringement, how-
ever, if the poem or song is performed live, without direct or in-
direct admission charge, and without compensation to any per-
formers or promoters. There is an additional specific exemption
if the performance takes place in the course of religious services
at a place of worship.
Another specific statutory exemption endorses a recent decision
of the Supreme Court, Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken 4 7
by declaring that it is not an infringing performance to transmit in
public a copyrighted work "on a single receiving apparatus of a kind
45 Id.
46 ld. § 110(4)(B).
47422 U.S. 151 (1975).
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commonly used in private homes," 48 such as a radio set in a doctor's
office or a television set in a taproom. The statute sets forth certain
other, rather refined, circumstances in which public performances
of nondramatic literary or musical works-face-to-face or by direct
transmission-will not infringe.
In addition to giving the copyright owner the privilege to
forbid certain public performances which were formerly allowable,
the 1976 Act extends the "compulsory license" concept to certain
uses for which the copyright owner under the prior law could not
collect a penny. One prime example is the "public performance"
of musical compositions on jukeboxes.49 The jukebox exemption
has been abolished, in light of the substantial remuneration reaped
by jukebox operators when musical performers have done the sowing
(by making phonograph records). If the jukebox operator files with
the Copyright Office and affixes a certificate to the box, any phono-
records may be placed therein (the "compulsory" part of the com-
pulsory license), but the operator must pay $8.00 per box per year
as a total royalty covering all of the records used. All of these
proceeds, to be paid to the Copyright Office, are then to be divided
among the owners of copyright in songs that have been in jukeboxes
during the year. It is expected that the division of the proceeds
will be expeditiously handled by the methods utilized under the
1909 Act by the principal performance rights organizations (Amer-
ican Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, and Broadcast
Music, Inc.) to distribute royalties for performances on radio and
television broadcasts, in restaurants and nightclubs, and the like.
Any disputed claims are to be resolved by a new and important
administrative agency established under the 1976 Act, the Copy-
right Royalty Tribunal. The compulsory license for music in juke-
boxes generates royalties only for the owner of copyright in the
musical composition (generally, the composer or publisher) and not
for the recording companies or the recording performers; there is
as yet no performance right for musical renditions as distinct from
musical compositions.
Also eliminated under the 1976 Act is the exemption, by virtue
of two major Supreme Court decisions, for transmission of copy-
righted works through cable television. 0 Although the Court held
that cable systems do not "perform" copyrighted dramas, lectures or
songs, as that term was to be understood under the 1909 Act, the
48 17 U.S.C.A. § 110(5) (Supp. 1977).
49 See id. § 116.
50 See text accompanying notes 11-12 supra.
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1976 Act now expands the definition of "perform" and provides a
definition of "transmit" that together bring cable transmissions
within the scope of the copyright monopoly. But here too, the
monopoly is "impaired" through the device of the compulsory
license. The cable-television provisions 51 are by far the most lengthy
and complex provisions of the new Copyright Act. They must be
perused to be believed, if not understood. To oversimplify some-
what: any cable re-transmission of copyrighted material televised
over the air will be allowed, provided the cable re-transmission is
authorized under the rules of the Federal Communications Com-
mission and provided the cable system pays a royalty specifically
articulated in the statute. By deferring to the rules of the FCC,
Congress has attempted to coordinate copyright policy and com-
munications policy. Exemption from copyright liability upon the
payment of royalties will foster the growth of a developing industry
along the lines contemplated by the congressional commerce com-
mittees and the FCC, while the payment of royalties will protect in
some measure the creative talents who develop and produce over-
the-air television programs. Accordingly, the elaborate fee schedule
for the "compulsory licensee" cable systems represents a blend of
ability to pay along with a measure of the expanded audience to
which the copyright owner's work is transmitted through the cable
(or, phrased in other terms, the audience from which the copyright
owner can no longer reap an economic benefit by virtue of the pre-
emption on the part of the cable system). It is hoped, again, the
royalties will be amicably divided (with a boost in the form of an
exemption from the antitrust laws for this purpose) by those claim-
ing copyright in re-transmitted programs during the accounting
period, with controversies to be resolved by the Copyright Royalty
Tribunal. A cable transmission will infringe if, among other things,
it is not permitted by the FCC, or if the cable system willfully alters
the transmitted program or transmits it at a later time, or if the
cable system fails to file certain stipulated notices with the Copyright
Office or to account with that Office for royalties due.
The compulsory license 52 continues to operate under the 1976
Act where it originated in 1909: Once the copyright owner permits
the distribution of a phonorecord of his musical composition, any
other persons may make and distribute their own recording of the
same composition, provided they comply with the notification and
accounting provisions of the act. Instead of paying two cents per
5 17 U.S.C.A. § Ill (Supp. 1977).
52 Id. § 115.
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recording to the owner of the musical copyright, the compulsory
licensee is now required by the act to pay two and three-quarters
cents, a generous concession to inflation since 1909. Direct dubbing
from another record, however, remains an infringement of copyright
in the sound recording (as distinguished from the work inscribed
thereon). This dubbing right, and the right to dub sounds directly
for the purpose of creating a "derivative work," are the only rights
in the nature of copyright that are presently owned by the proprietor
of the sound recording; there is no performance right generating
royalties for the recording company or recording artist when the
phonorecord is played in public.5
3
The compulsory license device is also used-again by way of
giving the copyright owner rights not previously available-in the
field of noncommercial broadcasting, the prime exemplar being
public television stations. 4 Such stations are free to perform pub-
lished nondramatic musical compositions or to display published
pictorial, graphic and sculptural works, provided they pay a royalty
to the copyright proprietor. The royalty will hopefully be nego-
tiated between representatives of copyright owners and representa-
tives of public broadcasting, but if not it will be fixed by the
Copyright Royalty Tribunal. No such compulsory license will ex-
tend to broadcasts of literary works, whether dramatic or non-
dramatic.
The Copyright Royalty Tribunal is empowered and directed
periodically to examine and if appropriate to revise the existing
schedules of compulsory royalties in the fields in which it oversees
the compulsory license: phonorecords of musical compositions, juke-
box performances of musical compositions, cable transmissions of all
copyrighted works, and public-broadcasting transmissions of musical
compositions and works of art.
The one remaining major issue in the area of infringement and
allowable uses is the doctrine of fair use. That doctrine, elusive and
judicially developed, has found its way into the statute, where it
remains elusive. The draftsmen have made it clear that their pur-
pose is not to modify the doctrine, but simply to endorse it as
developed at common law. Section 107 of the 1976 Act acknowl-
edges that there is no finite list of fair uses of copyrighted works.
Instead, the section gives some illustrations of situations in which
fair use is commonly invoked-"criticism, comment, news reporting,
53 As of this writing, a report by the Register of Copyrights is due that may
suggest creation of performance rights for recording artists. See id. § 114(d).
54 Id. § 118.
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teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship,
or research"-and articulates four criteria which it will be the task
of the court to employ in particular instances:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit edu-
cational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work.
It will be for the courts to continue to weigh the importance to the
public interest of the dissemination of the copyrighted material
against the economic harm to the copyright proprietor.
Perhaps the most common situation in which fair-use criteria
are invoked is that of the photocopying of copyrighted material.
Photocopy machines have become widely accessible, not only in
businesses and other large institutions, but also to the public gen-
erally, with such machines being commonly placed in libraries and
post offices. Much of the material now photocopied, such as one's
own personal letters or tax and insurance forms, raise no substantial
issue of infringement. But there may be infringement when one
photocopies such material as newspaper and journal articles, poems,
maps, songs and drawings (particularly when they are copied in full
rather than in part). Perhaps all that can be said with any con-
fidence, as a guide to persons making photocopies of copyrighted
material, is that it is more likely that "fair use" will not be available
when all or almost all of the work is copied, and when multiple
copies are being made, and when the photocopying person is doing
it in pursuit of a business purpose, and when the photocopying is
substituting for what realistically would be a purchase of one or
more copies of the copyrighted work from trade sources.
The frequency of photocopying by libraries induced Congress
to prepare a specific set of statutory directives,55 which are designed
to supplement and not to supplant the ordinarily applicable prin-
ciples of fair use. A library open to the public may photocopy a
work, provided there is no commercial advantage and provided that
it affixes a copyright notice, under any of the following circum-
stances: it copies an unpublished work for purposes of preserva-
tion and security, or for deposit in another library for research pur-
55 Id. § 108.
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poses; it copies a published work that is damaged, deteriorating,
lost or stolen, provided it cannot find an unused replacement on the
market; it makes, at the request of a person using it for private
study or research, a copy of a single entire article or of a "small
part" of any other copyrighted work; it makes, at the request of a
person using it for private study or research, a copy of an entire
work or of a "substantial part" of it, provided the work is not ob-
tainable at a fair price. The library is not rendered liable for any
copying done on its premises, by a library user, at an unsupervised
photocopy machine, provided the library has posted a notice there
which warns that the user may be subject to the copyright law.
Presumably, an individual at that machine or elsewhere may law-
fully make photocopies-without asking the library to do the work-
under the same conditions the library could, that is, of an entire arti-
cle or an entire larger work not obtainable at a fair price, provided
the purpose is private study or research. If the work is a musical work
or a work of art, the library's permission to photocopy may only
be for the purpose of preservation, security and replacement on
account of loss or theft, but not for the purpose of satisfying user
requests for study or research. It is likely, however, that some of
the latter kinds of requests for library photocopying might fall
within the fair use doctrine. Finally, all of the above library priv-
ileges are limited to the making of single copies on separate occa-
sions, and do not justify the making of "related or concerted"
multiple photocopies. Nor may the library make even otherwise
allowable single and unrelated copies, if that library engages in
"systematic reproduction" (a term that is left undefined and that
may, if broadly construed, very substantially undermine the priv-
ileges given to libraries by Congress in the body of section 108).
In keeping with the general intention of Congress to preserve
the preexisting rules of fair use, the 1976 Act explicitly endorses
what had earlier been the law regarding the right to borrow the
"ideas" or "systems" described in copyrighted works: such ideas and
systems are not copyrightable. Section 102(b) of the new law pro-
vides: "In no case does copyright protection for an original work
of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method
of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form
in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in
such work." 6
56 This principle was freely borrowed from the decision of the Supreme Court
in Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880).
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POSTSCRIPT
There are some who have questioned whether the world of
entertainment and the arts is better off now than under the 1909
Act. For this author, it is clear that the 1976 Act marks an im-
portant and constructive step forward, in at least three major
respects.
First, the 1976 Act simplifies the law of copyright. Some will
no doubt find this proposition dubious, if not laughable, given the
proliferation of words and details in the new law. It is true that
the statute is far more prolix and in many respects far more intricate
and complex than was the 1909 Act. One can point to the provi-
sions on cable television, exempted performances of musical and
literary works, library photocopying, and termination of copyright
transfers. But for all their complexity, these provisions do deal
squarely with issues that are themselves complex and that call into
play sharply conflicting interests that must be accommodated to
make the law work. These provisions, though complex, provide
concrete guidance and solutions, and for the most part they can be
understood (at least by lawyers, or even by intrepid laymen), and
that is a form of "simplicity." Greater simplicity is also provided
by the new principles and definitions articulated in the 1976 Act.
Among the simplifying principles are those of federal preemption of
copyright from the date a work is created, a single term of protec-
tion for newly created works, and the divisibility of copyright
ownership. Among the simplifying definitions are those given to
the words reproduce, copy, publish, display, public, perform, joint
work and work made for hire.
A second overall improvement in the statute is the greater
protection it gives to authors. The duration of protection is now
generally longer than before, and is in any event guaranteed (for
newly created works) substantially to outlive the author. The more
lenient provisions dealing with copyright notice will also cause
fewer forfeitures of copyright than in the past. The right to ter-
minate transfers of copyright interests will not be subject to divesti-
ture in advance through contractual arrangements (unlike the re-
newal right under the 1909 Act). Copyright protection is now given
for uses of a work on cable television, in jukeboxes, on public broad-
casting stations and, in many instances, in nonprofit educational
and charitable institutions. Some might argue that the expanded
protection of the copyright owner has gone too far. Surely it is
questionable whether, for example, the draftsmen made out a suffi-
cient case to warrant extending the net of infringement around
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classroom performances of dramatic works using an actor from out-
side the school, or around the performance of a scene from a play
in the school auditorium, or around the performance of a song by
the high school band at half time, or around the photocopying of
short segments of an article by a library that fills such requests
"systematically" (whatever that may mean). But I believe that on
the whole the statute, particularly through its extension of the
principle of the compulsory license, strikes a better balance between
the author and the public than did the 1909 Act, at least as that Act
was construed by the courts.
Finally, quite apart from the manner in which the new Act
deals with the technology that has developed since the motion pic-
ture, at least it does deal with that technology. It brings the law of
copyright into the second half of the twentieth century, and attempts
to cope with most issues surrounding radio, television, the photo-
copy machine, the computer, and other techniques of reproduction
known and unknown. The tough issues of copyright regulation
have now been decided by the Congress rather than by the courts,
as was consistently the case under the 1909 Act. The courts did less
than a sterling job in adapting the opaque provisions of the old Act
to the problems of the new technology, witness such holdings as
that the widespread sale of phonograph records did not divest com-
mon law copyright; 57 that the delivery of a speech before tens of
thousands of persons and the transmission of that speech through-
out the nation by television did not divest common law copyright; 58
that the display of a pictorial or sculptural work on television did
not infringe, since no "copy" was made; 19 that an author could,
during the first term of copyright, make a binding transfer (typically
through a form contract) of his interest in the renewal term; 60 that
cable-television transmissions of copyrighted programs being shown
on conventional broadcasts, without the consent of the copyright
owner and across hundreds of miles, were not an infringement (be-
cause cable transmission is functionally akin to "viewing" the pro-
gram);"' and that the question of performance rights in phonograph
records was principally a matter of local concern to be regulated by
state misappropriation law undisturbed by any preemptive implica.
5 7 Yacoubian v. Carroll, 74 U.S.P.Q. 257 (S.D. Cal. 1947).
58 King v. Mister Maestro, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1903).
59 Mura v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 245 F. Supp. 587 ,(S.D.N.Y.
1965).
60 Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643 (1943).
61 Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 415 U.S. 394
(1974).
1978]
884 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 126:856
tion of the Federal Copyright Act.6 2 While the courts of the twenty-
first century may fare no better, we have, at least for now, a detailed
set of rules, representing an accommodation of deeply felt interests
of enormous economic import, rules that have been shaped by the
legislature rather than by the courts. The legislative process can
better develop a factual record upon which these interests can be
assessed in the context of a larger industry picture. The 1976 Act
also creates an administrative agency, the Copyright Royalty Tri-
bunal, that will provide some facility for the adaptation of the law,
without formal statutory amendment, in response to changing eco-
nomic facts.
Congress has not, unfortunately, been able to resolve all of the
tough questions, and it may have left too many unresolved. It deals
with the issue of infringement of copyrighted works through their
application in a computer, simply by saying that the law is to be the
same as it was under the 1909 Act. 3 It deals with the issue of the
extent to which copyright protects a work that blends decoration and
utility, simply by saying that the law is to be the same as it was under
the 1909 Act.64 It postpones resolving the issue of "performers'
rights" in radio and jukebox plays of phonograph records, although
the issue has been debated thoroughly for almost two decades.6 5 Yet
the computer issue and the issue of performers' rights are presently
being addressed by a presidential commission and by the Register of
Copyrights, respectively, and as to both there has been constructive
movement toward a resolution, which will presumably be incorpo-
rated in the new Act.
In sum, the 1976 Copyright Act is a substantial improvement
over what went before. One hopes that its performance will be as
satisfactory as its promise.
62 Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
63 17 U.S.C.A. § 117 (Supp. 1977).
64 Id. § 113(b).
65 Id. § 114(d).
